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1. Introduction	  
This paper explores the effect of transnational private regulation on labour standards through the 
lens of a study of the International Finance Corporation’s ‘performance standards’ system. A broad 
and diverse range of studies exists on the challenges of promoting decent work and improved labour 
standards in developing countries. While it has been argued that transnational private regulation 
systems like corporate codes of conduct and multistakeholder sustainability standards have the 
potential to improve employee welfare, little consensus exists on their effectiveness. There seem to 
be two reasons why drawing firm conclusions about transnational private labour regulation (TPLR) 
is difficult. First, existing scholarship on both sides of the argument is largely based on qualitative 
case studies of small numbers of businesses or of single industries in particular countries or regions. 
Generalization on the basis of these studies is difficult. Second, the literature does not 
systematically take into account the fact that the existing capacity of local actors, particularly trade 
unions, to enforce or encourage the enforcement of TPLR is a critical intervening variable that 
conditions the impact of transnational regulation on employee welfare outcomes. The picture is 
complicated further by the fact that a large majority of TPLR schemes include guarantees of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights that potentially increase the capacity of 
workers to act collectively. Taken together, these two factors suggest that a realistic global 
evaluation of the potential of TPLR to improve the lives of workers in developing economies 
demands not only a broadly quantitative research strategy that allows a wider range of cases to be 
taken into consideration, but also a better understanding of the degree to which the enforcement of 
transnational private regulation schemes relies on local actors, and workers in particular.  
This approach is consistent with the recent sociological turn in international relations and 
international political economy. Although work in these fields varies considerably in its theoretical 
background and its conclusions with respect to reorienting the focus of enquiry in future studies of 
contemporary life, there is a broad consensus that a proper understanding of the power of 
transnational private regulation schemes requires the study of the concrete practices by which social 
forces are implicated in the enforcement of such schemes. From this view, compliance with TPLR 
should be understood as locally and socially constructed. As Wells underlines, this would therefore 
be useless to assess labour standards without fully taking into account “the roles that Southern 
workers and their local allies play in promoting labour standards improvements at the point of 
production” (Wells 2009, p.568). 
In this paper we present the results of a study designed from the perspective of this international 
political sociology. The study attempts to get one step closer to a realistic global evaluation of 
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TPLR by using a principally quantitative approach to assess the impact of one prominent private 
regulation scheme on the ability of workers to act collectively at firm level. The International 
Finance Corporation’s ‘Performance Standards’ system is particularly appropriate as a subject for a 
research project of this type because, unusually, it is applied in the same form across a wide range 
of industrial sectors and in a large number of different countries. The study covered 145 IFC client 
businesses in eight countries across three continents. It drew on information made publicly 
available by the IFC, on interviews with a range of informants including IFC staff, officers of 
global union federations and of national and local trade union organizations, and on survey 
responses from managers, union representatives and workers in a total of 55 IFC client businesses. 
Our findings show that the impact of the IFC’s performance standards system on worker agency is 
marginal at best. While IFC client businesses are more likely to be unionised than similar non-client 
businesses, no reason was found to believe that this was a result of the application of the scheme. In 
those very few cases where change could be causally linked to the standards, the effect depended on 
the presence of workers’ organizations that already had the capacity to take effective action. No 
cases were found in which the emergence of worker organization or the introduction of collective 
bargaining could be linked to unilateral employer efforts to comply with the performance standards 
or action taken by IFC to enforce compliance. The study also uncovered prima facie evidence of 
breaches of freedom of association rights occurring in a significant minority of the businesses 
surveyed with no apparent reaction from IFC. Perhaps the most striking finding was that ninety five 
percent of the workers interviewed reported that they were unaware of their employers’ 
commitment to respect the performance standards’ provisions on workers’ organizations. 
The paper begins with a review of the literature on the impact of private regulation on the capacity 
of workers to act collectively in pursuit of improvements in their own conditions of employment. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of the contractually based legal structure typical of 
transnational private regulation. The paper goes on to describe the IFC’s performance standards 
system and the associated compliance monitoring and evaluation process before proposing four 
hypotheses about the impact of the standards on the behaviour of client businesses and the expected 
‘knock-on’ effect on union membership and social dialogue. After a short examination of the most 
important methodological issues confronted in the project, the paper considers each hypothesis on 
the basis of the evidence gathered. The paper discusses these results before drawing some 
concluding remarks on the implications and limitations of the research. While generalization on the 
basis of this relatively small-scale study of a single regulation scheme is obviously hazardous, we 
suggest that the failure of the IFC scheme to have any significant impact on worker agency may be 
due to the contractual legal structure which is such that the supposed beneficiaries of private 
regulation have no direct capacity to make claims for the enforcement of their ‘rights’. Whether or 
not rights are ultimately enforced via the contractual mechanisms depends on the attitudes and 
intentions of, and power relations between, the different participants in regulatory space.  
2. Literature	  review:	  The	  impact	  of	  private	  regulation	  on	  the	  ‘collective	  capacity’	  of	  
workers	  
Within the literature on the impact of supply chain codes of conduct, investment conditionality, and 
multistakeholder product certification schemes there is a range of views about the potential of non-
state regulation to durably improve the condition of workers. A significant number of authors have 
argued that there is little reason to believe that these voluntary codes and standards schemes will 
lead to a transformation of the social relations underpinning production. Authors in this stream of 
the literature believe that the voluntary nature of private regulation gives rise to what Anner (2012) 
calls a ‘threat-of-defection dynamic’: as long as firms have some influence over the design of 
regulation schemes via the leverage that arises from their ability to choose not to participate, TPLR 
will only ever change enterprise behaviour within limits set by the enterprises themselves.  
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Where these limits are to be found depends in part on the nature of the regulation itself. In this 
respect a distinction needs to be drawn between freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights and other, more substantive labour standards. This distinction is frequently drawn in the 
existing literature. Either freedom of association and collective bargaining rights are treated as 
meriting separate evaluation (Anner, 2012; Brudney, 2012; Caraway, 2006; Chan, 2013); or the 
argument is made that a properly nuanced evaluation of the effectiveness of private labour 
standards regulation demands that we consider substantive ‘outcome standards’ and procedural or 
‘process rights’ separately (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007; 
Neumayer and Soysa, 2006). While the category of outcome standards includes rules that specify 
pay, holiday entitlement, benefits in kind, the provision of safety equipment and so on, the category 
of process rights encompasses rules that provide workers with rights to voice and participation in 
the organizational and supra-organizational processes by which outcome standards are set and 
compliance with them is reviewed.  
Having drawn this distinction we can see that there are two (mutually compatible) possible 
outcomes of TPLR. On the one hand, improvements to pay and conditions of work may come about 
as the result of direct, unilateral employer action intended to bring workplace practice into line with 
outcome standards set in private regulation schemes. Alternatively – or in addition – TPLR may 
change the type of collective worker action that is possible in practice by changing the industrial 
relations process rights that workers enjoy.  This in turn may lead to a situation in which 
improvements in employment conditions come about because workers acting collectively have the 
will and the capacity to demand them. Many researchers believe that this is the more critical 
potential outcome. As Brudney puts it, "codes can be effectively monitored and enforced only when 
workers play an active internal role... But unless corporate suppliers make an unequivocal 
commitment to respect freedom of association, very few workers will ever play that role." (2012, p. 
15).  
Overall, the existing empirical research shows that while TPLR has had at least some impact on 
outcome standards, there has in fact been no discernible effect on process rights. It has been found 
that while firms are often prepared to make modest improvements to working conditions to win the 
business of reputation-sensitive buyers or access to premium price markets, they remain unwilling 
to accept any significant increase in the capacity of workers to influence management decisions 
about employment conditions and the organization of work (Anner, 2012; Barrientos and Smith, 
2007; Egels-Zandén and Merk, 2013; Fransen, 2013). As Anner puts it, “the desire for legitimacy 
and reputational protection are mitigated by another corporate motivator: control” (ibid., p.633).  
Despite the pessimism of many researchers, there remain some optimists who believe that it is too 
early to dismiss the possibility that private labour regulation could ultimately increase the capacity 
of workers to take collective action in pursuit of improvements in their own working conditions. 
These authors believe that a proper assessment of the question demands that the research focus shift 
away from rules and compliance mechanisms in themselves towards the impact in practice of 
regulation systems on the conditions that promote worker agency or, as we call it, workers’ 
‘collective capacity’. They believe that taking account of the interaction between transnational 
codes and standards, the local institutional context and the capacities of local actors shows that in 
certain circumstances private regulation can affect the ability of workers on the ground to organize 
and take action in pursuit of improvements in working conditions (Cradden and Graz, 2015; Nelson 
et al., 2005; Riisgaard, 2009; Selwyn, 2013; Taylor, 2012; Wells, 2009). 
As things stand, it is not clear whether there are better grounds for optimism or pessimism. The 
research that currently exists on both sides of the argument is largely based on qualitative case 
studies of small numbers of businesses or of single industries in particular countries or regions. 
Generalisation, then, is very difficult. While some cross-national comparative research does exist 
(Locke et al., 2013; Riisgaard, 2009), it is limited in its sectoral and geographical scope. Anner’s 
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analysis (2012) of more than 800 Fair Labour Association audits is a notable exception to these 
tendencies, but it focuses on the potential of FLA audit procedures to detect evidence of the 
violation of process standards rather than on the actual effectiveness of regulation schemes as a 
means to clear a space for the development of independent worker representation. 
3. The	  Legal	  structure	  of	  private	  compliance	  initiatives,	  the	  decision	  to	  enforce	  and	  the	  
role	  of	  local	  actors	  
Like other types of private regulation, the IFC’s performance standards system does not give 
workers any new rights. Although it places a duty on employers to respect certain rules and 
standards with respect to their workforce, that duty derives from a private commercial contract and 
is owed to the IFC, not the workers themselves. Only the IFC can make a claim for the performance 
of the contract and it is free to enforce its regulation or not as it chooses. The freedom of private 
regulators to enforce or not enforce according to whatever rules and procedures they choose to 
follow has certain implications for research into regulatory impact. First, it is critical to understand 
the circumstances in which a regulator will choose to take action. Second, in the absence of 
independent complaints procedures and effective remedies, the potential for workers to make gains 
from the regulation is principally a question of their capacity to take political or industrial action (a) 
to pressure regulators into taking action and/or (b) to pressure employers to respect the normative 
commitments they have taken on in participating in the regulation scheme. This implies a further 
question, which is the extent to which the rules that regulators unilaterally choose to enforce are 
likely to create or increase worker capacity to take collective action of this kind. In the first 
instance, then, rather than being the outcome of an independent judicial or arbitration process that 
can be triggered by worker complaints, compliance enforcement depends on the regulator’s 
awareness of standards violations and on its willingness to take action to seek redress. Three 
conditions for enforcement follow from this.  
The first condition is information: if a regulator is to take enforcement action it obviously has to be 
aware that some alleged violation has taken place. Information may come from pro-active 
compliance monitoring activity or via direct communication from those affected by the alleged 
violation. 
The second condition concerns the interpretation of the standards. Whether or not enforcement 
action is taken depends on the regulator accepting that the client is noncompliant. In the case of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, what counts as compliance is likely to be 
contested as, despite the claims of those proposing the global labour governance thesis, there is no 
international consensus even about the basic logic of protecting these rights. 
The third condition for enforcement is a perception on the part of the regulator that it is in its 
interest to take steps to enforce. Even where it can be established that a participant is non-
compliant, this is not the beginning and end of the decision. From the perspective of private 
regulators, the application of enforcement measures is not free of costs. Aside from the possibility 
of deterring potential new participants, too rigorous an approach to enforcement may ultimately 
lead to a loss of business. On the other hand, a failure to enforce the standards in the face of serious 
and publicly evident non-compliance will damage the credibility and reputation of the regulator, a 
process that is clearly susceptible to being influenced by labour organization campaigns. From the 
regulator’s perspective there is therefore a balance to be struck in terms of enforcement that will 
vary depending on the participant and the financial, social and political context of its activity.  
With respect to IFC, all of this means that a balanced overall assessment of the impact of the 
performance standards system demands that we consider not just the IFC’s attitude and practices 
with respect to information, interpretation and interest, but also workers’ capacity to intervene in 
each of these areas together with any evidence that that capacity has been increased as a result of 
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the presence or application of the standards. In practice this means that our primary interest is in the 
impact of the regulation on collective industrial relations at the firm level.  
4. The	  IFC’s	  performance	  standards	  system	  
The IFC is the single most important provider of development finance aimed at the private sector, 
accounting for approximately one third of all finance provided to private enterprises in the 
developing world by development finance institutions (International Finance Corporation, 2011), 
whether in the form of loans, equity funding, investment guarantees or other types of funding. The 
capacity to grant or not grant financing together with the long-term relationship with the client that 
results from the provision of funds gives the IFC a range of powerful levers that can be used to 
influence the behaviour of the enterprises in question. Since 2006 the IFC has systematically 
required its clients to comply with social and environmental performance standards as a condition 
for the receipt of financing (International Finance Corporation, 2006a, 2006b; Warner, 2006). The 
adoption of this enterprise-level conditionality approach was the result of several years of intense 
engagement with other international organizations, notably the International Labour Organization, 
and pressure from the international environmental and labour movements (Caraway, 2006; Hagen, 
2003; ITUC, 2011). At the time of its introduction, the IFC performance standards system was 
described as “the new international benchmark standard for environmental and social performance 
of the private sector in developing countries” (Warner, 2006). The characterisation of the IFC’s 
system as private regulation could be contested on the grounds that IFC is a public 
intergovernmental organization rather than a private actor. However, as the standards conditionality 
applies to firms rather than states, and as these firms have a choice about whether to seek finance 
from IFC, which competes with other lenders, its status as a public organization is relevant only to 
the extent that there is a certain prestige attached to becoming an IFC client. For our purposes, the 
most interesting aspect of the IFC scheme is that, while most supply chain codes of conduct and 
labelling/certification schemes are specific to particular industries, specific countries or even both, 
the performance standards system was designed to apply in any sectoral context and does not vary 
depending on the country in which it is applied.  
The	  standards	  
There are eight performance standards (commonly known as PS1 to PS8) designed to ensure that 
IFC clients operate in a socially and environmentally sustainable way. Performance standard 1 or 
PS1 is a ‘process’ standard and deals with the management of social and environmental risks. The 
substantive performance standards (numbers 2 to 8) against which social and environmental risks 
must be assessed cover: labour and working conditions; pollution prevention and abatement; 
community health; safety and security; land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable natural resource management; indigenous peoples and cultural 
heritage.  
The standard dealing with labour and working conditions (PS2) is largely derived from the ILO’s 
‘core conventions’, which is to say the eight conventions identified in the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. In this project we are concerned specifically with the 
‘Workers’ Organizations’ provisions of PS2 which, deal with freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. The performance standards were revised in 2012, and some changes were made to the 
workers’ organizations provisions. The paragraphs below show the original provisions, with the 
modifications made in 2012 in brackets. 
9 [13]. In countries where national law recognizes workers’ rights to form and to join 
workers ’ organizations of their choosing without interference and to bargain collectively, 
the client will comply with national law. Where national law substantially restricts workers’ 
organizations, the client will enable [enable will not restrict workers from developing] 
alternative means for workers to express their grievances and protect their rights regarding 
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working conditions and terms of employment. [The client should not seek to influence or 
control these mechanisms]. 
10 [14]. In either case described in paragraph 9 [13], and where national law is silent, the 
client will not discourage workers from forming or joining workers’ organizations of their 
choosing or from bargaining collectively, and will not discriminate or retaliate against 
workers who participate, or seek to participate, in such organizations and bargain 
collectively [bargain collectively collective bargaining]. Clients will engage with such 
worker representatives [and provide them with information needed for meaningful 
negotiation in a timely manner]. Worker organizations are expected to fairly represent the 
workers in the workforce. 
The	  IFC	  risk	  assessment	  process	  
Once an application for funding has been made by a business, there are four stages that a project 
must pass before being funded. The first three of these (Early Review, Investment Appraisal and 
Investment Review) involve IFC staff members only and the final stage (Board Review and 
Approval) involves the IFC’s Board of Directors. In the pre-board-level stages of the review 
process, a key factor in decision-making is the degree to which the project presents social and 
environmental risks and impacts and the likelihood that the potential client “can be expected to 
undertake the project in a manner consistent with the performance standards” (International Finance 
Corporation, 2012a, p. 14).  
It is important to understand that if a potential client is not already in conformity with the 
performance standards, this is not necessarily an obstacle to its being granted financing by IFC. 
Interviews with senior staff show that for IFC, what counts is the willingness of a business to bring 
its operations into conformity and the likelihood that appropriate mitigation measures can be agreed 
and put into place. 
IFC staff categorize projects into high, medium and low risk categories (categories A, B and C, 
respectively). The risk categorization is based in turn on an employer self-assessment in which the 
measures required, if any, to bring the business into conformity with all relevant national regulation 
as well as the substantive performance standards (numbers 2 to 8) are identified. In cases where 
“local communities may be affected by risks or adverse impacts from a project” (International 
Finance Corporation, 2012b, p. 18) this self-assessment must include consultation with the 
community. If the assessment identifies mitigation measures that need to be taken in order to bring 
the business into conformity with the required standards, an ‘Action Plan’ must be prepared which 
sets out these measures. In the event that a business is taken on as an IFC client, it “is required to 
disclose its Action Plan in advance of project implementation to affected communities and 
stakeholders, and provide updates throughout the life of the project as mitigation measures are 
adjusted and upgraded, reflecting the feedback from the affected communities” (International 
Finance Corporation, 2012b, p. 16). 
The risk categorization also determines the requirements for environmental and social disclosure. 
For all projects scheduled for Board level review, a ‘Summary of Investment Information’ (SII) 
document is made available, but only for projects classed as categories A or B is there any 
requirement for the disclosure of environmental and social information, which takes the form of an 
‘Environmental and Social Review Summary’ (ESRS). The SII includes the project’s risk 
categorization, basic financial and project information and the contact details of the client business. 
The ESRS includes a description of the project risks based on the environmental and social risk 
assessment, the rationale for the categorization (A or B) and the key measures that have been or will 
be put in place to mitigate risks and impacts. 
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What	  counts	  as	  a	  ‘risk’	  under	  the	  PS2	  provisions	  on	  workers’	  organizations?	  
Interviews with senior IFC environment and social compliance staff found that the organization 
maintains what it believes to be a neutral posture with respect to collective industrial relations. In 
the words of a senior officer, the IFC is “agnostic” about unionisation. The IFC’s internal oversight 
body, known as the office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), confirms that this is the 
prevalent understanding of freedom of association within the organization: “the CAO’s role is 
neither to promote unionization of the workforce, nor to discourage it. Rather, CAO expects that 
workers are able to choose freely whether or not to join a union, without fear of reprisals, in line 
with applicable national law and IFC’s PS2” (CAO, 2012, p. 6). Even in cases where there is recent 
experience of unionization and collective bargaining, IFC will not require businesses to consider 
recognising a union where this is not required by local labour law. It is unwilling to insist even that 
businesses meet and talk with unrecognized unions even where a very significant minority of 
employees are union members (CAO, 2012).  
In terms of written materials, there are two relevant IFC source documents, the Guidance Notes on 
the performance standards and the IFC Labor Toolkit, that may indicate what compliance with the 
PS2 provisions is understood to involve. The former document (International Finance Corporation, 
2012c) is a general aid to the interpretation of the performance standards, while the latter “aims to 
assist environmental and social specialists at IFC to assess the risk of likely issues under PS2 in 
relation to projects, to assess compliance and then to determine likely action points that need to be 
taken in relation to non-compliances” (International Finance Corporation, 2008, p. 1). Not 
surprisingly, in both of these documents, reference is made to the requirement for employers to 
avoid intimidation or punishment of workers on account of union membership or activity, and there 
is some emphasis on avoiding any practices that could be interpreted as attempts to undermine the 
independence or credibility of recognized unions. However, both documents are notably silent on 
the questions (a) of the circumstances under which it is reasonable for a business to recognize a 
union and whether or not actively resisting recognition is compatible with PS2 and (b) what 
constitutes reasonable employer behaviour in reaction to approaches from existing trade unions 
wishing to organize in their workplaces. 
Nevertheless, if the employees of a particular enterprise should choose to unionize, paragraph 
10[14] of PS2 seems to place a duty on employers to respond positively to any subsequent request 
to regulate working conditions via collective bargaining, at least in those cases where national law 
is silent on the question of union recognition and the duty to bargain. Paragraph 9 also places a clear 
duty on employers to ensure that there is some means of worker representation, even if national 
legislation means that this cannot take the formal form of a trade union. 
Complaints	  
The performance standards system does not itself include a formal complaints mechanism directly 
accessible to workers. However, there are two possibilities for resolving problems. First, workers, 
whether individually or collectively, can file a complaint with the Office of the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (CAO), which describes itself as the IFC’s “independent recourse mechanism”. The 
CAO process has two stages. In the first stage, the Ombudsman will investigate a complaint and 
will attempt to broker a solution between complainant and the IFC client. It will not, however, 
“make a judgment about the merits of a complaint, nor does it impose solutions or find fault.”1 If 
the complaint is not resolved satisfactorily, the second stage of the process is triggered. Depending 
on the outcome of an initial investigation, an independent audit may be conducted. Perhaps oddly, 
this involves not an investigation focused on the behaviour of the client business, but an audit of the 
conduct of the IFC itself from the perspective of the due diligence it ought to have applied in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  http://www.cao-­‐ombudsman.org/howwework/filecomplaint/	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supervising the client’s compliance with the performance standards. What is under assessment, 
therefore, is whether it was reasonable for the IFC to conclude that the performance standards were 
being respected. This is rather different from an assessment of whether the client business was 
actually in compliance with the social and environmental commitments it had signed up to. 
The second possibility for redress of grievances is to use a mechanism established via negotiation 
between IFC and the Global Unions – a body made up of the International Trade Union 
Confederation, nine global union federations and the Trade Union Advisory Committee of the 
OECD. This is an internet-based communications mechanism that allows trade unions to register 
complaints simultaneously with IFC and the Global Unions which are then followed up by both 
organizations working together. While this mechanism has enabled around thirty complaints to be 
registered, it remains informal in the sense that it lacks any kind of status or established procedure. 
Neither does it appear to be included in the website index page of the ‘Sustainability’ section of the 
IFC website, nor linked to from any other page on the site.  
5. The	  potential	  impact	  of	  PS2	  on	  collective	  industrial	  relations	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  
The difficulty with evaluating the impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights 
provisions is that even where these rights are being perfectly respected, we would not necessarily 
expect that workers will choose to join or form unions or demand to bargain collectively. The 
absence of collective industrial relations does not in itself entitle us to conclude that workers’ rights 
are being violated. However, workers’ choices about whether or not to pursue collective industrial 
relations are not made in isolation from the political and regulatory environment or the attitude and 
behaviour of their employers. While workers are likely to appreciate the potential benefits of taking 
collective action, they have to balance this against any perceived risk of employer resistance or 
reprisal and the available possibilities for legal and political redress should this occur. Only if 
employers are perceived by workers as being open to the possibility of introducing collective 
industrial relations, or if there is an easily accessible and effective legal remedy for any likely 
employer resistance or reprisal, will workers be free to evaluate the potential benefits of collective 
industrial relations from a purely pragmatic standpoint. 
The very fact that the IFC feels that it is necessary to include protections for independent worker 
organization in its standards system means that it recognises a risk that its actual and potential client 
businesses may take illegitimate steps to deter unionization or to resist participation in collective 
bargaining, and that legal remedies for workers may be inaccessible or ineffective. If there is a risk 
of this kind, then there is a corresponding probability that an underlying workers’ preference for 
collective industrial relations is not being satisfied in a certain proportion of cases.  
If the PS2 provisions on workers’ organizations are effective, we would expect to find that this 
probability is significantly reduced across the population of IFC client businesses and, as a 
consequence, that the incidence of collective industrial relations is higher on average in these 
businesses than in similar non-client businesses. More precisely, we would expect to find higher 
levels of unionization and collective bargaining among IFC client businesses as a result of the 
application of the performance standards system for one or more of the following reasons: 
(a) IFC may have a greater tendency to select as clients those businesses that already behave 
in a manner compatible with the standards 
(b) businesses may change their behaviour after becoming clients in response to IFC 
requirements, abandoning practices that deter unionization and collective bargaining 
(c) businesses’ commitment to respect PS2 may lower the perceived risk of taking collective 
action (even where there is no concrete change in management behaviour) 
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(d) the performance standards system may provide workers with a remedy for non-compliant 
employer behaviour.  
6. Hypotheses	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  performance	  standards	  
We can propose four hypotheses about the impact of transnational private regulation schemes on 
the enforcement of labour standards at the firm level. These hypotheses aim to evaluate the direct 
and indirect effects of the performance standards.  Two hypotheses relate to the overall state of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, and two relate to change in response to the 
performance standards. 
External	  differentiation	  
To probe the impact of the performance standards used by the IFC, it is critical to determine 
whether any observed difference in the incidence of collective industrial relations is due to IFC’s 
selection criteria rather than any change in management attitude or practice arising subsequently to 
becoming an IFC client, including action taken in response to complaints from workers. We thus 
need to assess whether IFC client businesses are in fact different from similar non-client businesses 
in terms of any relevant indicators relating to collective industrial relations. On the basis of the 
argument set out above we can propose the following hypothesis: 
H1 There is a significant difference between IFC client businesses and other firms in the same 
industrial sector and region with respect to one or more indicators of social dialogue. 
Conformity	  
The second issue is simply the conformity of IFC client businesses with the workers’ organizations 
paragraphs in PS2. The performance standards system is such that the fact of accession to the status 
of IFC client means that a business has either been deemed to be in conformity with the 
performance standards already, or that it is in conformity except in those areas specifically 
mentioned in any action plan as the target of risk mitigation measures. Given that this is the case, 
and taking account of any mitigation measures that may yet to be implemented, our second 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2 IFC client businesses are free of any significant violations either of the relevant national law 
or of the principle of freedom of association as set out in the workers’ organizations 
paragraphs of PS2 and in the accompanying guidance notes. 
Internal	  change	  :	  direct	  effects	  
Our third area of interest is the effect of action taken in response to explicit IFC requirements. As 
we saw above, whether the IFC actively requires clients to take any concrete action in response to 
the performance standards depends critically on the assessment of environmental and social risk 
carried out as part of the evaluation of each project proposal. In cases where risks related to labour 
and working conditions have been identified in the risk assessment process – in other words, a lack 
of conformity with the workers’ organizations paragraphs of the performance standards – client 
businesses will be required to take action to mitigate these risks and the agreed mitigation measures 
will be subject to ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Similarly, if complaints are made by workers’ 
organizations and upheld by IFC, this will give rise to further mitigation requirements. This gives 
rise to our third hypothesis: 
H3 In cases where mitigation measures concerning worker organizations or social dialogue are 
included in an action plan, or in cases where complaints have been made by workers’ 
organizations, upheld by IFC and corrective measures specified, we would expect to find 
evidence of change coherent with these measures. 
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Internal	  change	  :	  indirect	  effects	  
Our final area of interest is the indirect effect of businesses’ adherence to the performance 
standards. The existence of the performance standards gives a certain legitimacy to workers’ 
organizations and to processes of social dialogue. On the assumption that the content of the 
performance standards is widely known – an assumption that demands empirical confirmation – the 
performance standards system may in itself provide an impetus for industrial relations change by 
reducing the perceived risk of taking collective action. In this sense PS2 is akin to the kind of non-
legislative government action in support of collective employment relationships discussed by Howe 
(2012). As Howe suggests, however, the effect of this kind of action is very difficult to measure, but 
this certainly does not mean it is unimportant. It has been argued, for example, that the withdrawal 
of longstanding non-legislative support for collective bargaining and unionisation was a significant 
factor in the decline of the British trade union movement (Cradden, 2014; Howell, 2007). 
The possibility that the mere existence of PS2 may prompt a greater demand for unionisation 
among workers and a greater willingness among employers to accept it gives rise to our fourth 
hypothesis: 
H4 Even in those client businesses where IFC has not asked for specific measures to be taken 
relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, we would nevertheless 
expect to find evidence of change in one or more indicators of social dialogue. 
7. Methodology	  :	  social	  dialogue	  indicators	  in	  IFC	  client	  businesses	  and	  elsewhere	  
An obvious place to look for a meaningful indicator of workers’ collective capacity to take action is 
that group of statistics the International Labour Office (ILO) calls ‘social dialogue indicators’. 
There are four of these: trade union density, collective bargaining coverage, days lost to strikes, and 
membership of employers' associations (International Labour Office, 2011). The importance of 
these indicators in characterizing labour market structures and processes and cross-national 
variations in these areas is undeniable. On the basis of social dialogue indicators, for example, 
Korpi's power resources approach (2006a) and Hall and Soskice's varieties of capitalism (2001) 
have both made significant contributions to the field.  
Not all of the social dialogue indicators are appropriate for our purposes. Membership of 
employers’ associations is relevant only where bargaining takes place above the level of the 
enterprise and in any case is a measure of employer rather than worker collective organization. The 
number of days lost to strikes does not necessarily correlate with the existence of stable and 
effective collective organization among workers. Strikers are not necessarily union members and 
strikes may reflect political as much as industrial goals.  
This leaves collective bargaining coverage and trade union membership density. Collective 
bargaining coverage – the percentage of workers whose terms and conditions of work are set via 
negotiation between employers and unions – is a telling indicator of union influence, but is a 
statistic that makes sense only at the level of states or industrial sectors. Nevertheless, we could 
argue that a firm-level analogue is simply the presence or absence of collective bargaining in the 
workplace. 
Trade union density is widely accepted as representing an effective proxy for trade union power 
(Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000; Hayter and Stoevska, 2011; Kenworthy 
and Kittel, 2003; Traxler et al., 2001). Nevertheless, as a measure of the influence of organized 
labour, the level of union membership has to be understood in relation to its local context and is not 
directly comparable across national or sectoral boundaries. In order to be able to compare firm-level 
measures of density across different institutional contexts, union density has to be stated in relation 
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to the norm for businesses of a comparable size in the country or region and industrial sector in 
question. This in turn demands accurate baseline data about union density at the firm level.  
Despite the consensus on the value of density as an indicator of union organization and influence, 
the unevenness of the availability and accuracy of data puts narrow limits on its applicability even 
in OECD countries, to say nothing of less developed economies. Variations in data collection 
procedures, sources and measures merely complicate the picture (Hayter and Stoevska, 2011; 
International Labour Office, 2012, 2011; Lawrence and Ishikawa, 2005). The problems are such 
that many of those working in the field have questioned the relevance of comparative political 
economy approaches in research with a transnational dimension that includes developing economies 
(Bruff and Ebbenau, 2014; Korpi, 2006b; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011; Schneider, 2009). While 
these criticisms are entirely valid, if the impact of regulation is measured at the firm level at least 
some of the problems encountered at more aggregated levels of analysis can be avoided. 
There are three main sources for trade union membership data: state and union administrative 
records, labour force surveys (Bland, 1999) and establishment (company or workplace) surveys. 
Administrative records like membership figures declared in union registration procedures are of 
interest because of their low cost and high coverage (Pember, 1998). However, they are not 
collected specifically for statistical purposes and are highly politicized, frequently being 
intentionally over- or under-estimated (Senén Gonzalez et al., 2009; Visser, 2006, 1991). A further 
disadvantage is that data can only very rarely be disaggregated so as to provide firm-level figures. 
From the perspective of those seeking national or sectoral data, labour force surveys are very much 
to be preferred as a source of data on union membership on the assumption that they are carried out 
using adequate sampling techniques. They avoid in particular the danger that membership numbers 
will be over- or understated for political reasons. Nevertheless, they are expensive to conduct and 
demand a high level of technical competence. While they may permit the calculation of average 
density figures by industrial sector and business size, they still cannot be disaggregated to the firm 
level. 
For our purposes, the data of most interest is that arising from establishment surveys. This is the 
only kind of data that can be disaggregated to the firm level and is hence the only data that can be 
used to calculate the variance of firm-level density scores. Nevertheless, figures from labour force 
surveys and administrative records provide a useful check on the reliability of establishment survey 
data. 
The principal supplier of cross-nationally comparable firm-level data on businesses in developing 
economies is the World Bank Group, which has been conducting establishment surveys since the 
1990s. The Bank’s Enterprise Surveys website now claims to provide data on 130,000 firms in 135 
countries.2 Data is collected by private contractors in face-to-face structured interviews with 
business owners and senior managers for the main survey and up to 10 individual employees for the 
related employee survey (where this is included). Firms are selected according to a stratified 
sampling methodology (World Bank, 2009). The coverage of labour and employment issues in 
these surveys is limited, but up until around 2008-2009 they consistently included the simple 
question “What percentage of your workforce is currently unionized?”. Where employees are 
interviewed they are asked “Are you a member of a trade union?”. More recent surveys generally 
exclude these questions, although the 2011 survey of Rwanda is an exception in this respect. The 
surveys do not, however, include any questions about the incidence of collective bargaining. 
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  http://www.enterprisesurveys.org	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The outcome variables we aimed to measure for each IFC client business were all related to 
workers’ collective capacity to take action in pursuit of improvements in employment conditions. In 
order to simplify the task of measurement, we assumed that workers will choose to organize 
collectively if they believe that the consequences of so doing will not be negative. The greater the 
level of workers’ collective capacity, the more extensive and sophisticated collective organization 
will be in practice. This means that we used the actual level of collective organization observed at 
the firm level as a proxy for collective capacity. 
Our research strategy was to proceed via a ‘triangulation’ of opinions on the same subjects from 
three different types of respondent: ordinary workers, union representatives and managers. To this 
end, the research team developed three separate but linked questionnaires. Certain questions were 
included in all questionnaires, with appropriate variations in phrasing, while others were specific to 
each type of respondent. The questionnaires were designed to permit the most realistic possible 
assessment of the reality of freedom of association within each enterprise and to allow us to relate 
that situation to action taken in response to IFC’s performance standards, if any. About one third of 
the questions were written specifically with a view to understanding the concrete effect of the 
application of the IFC performance standards framework. The rest were drawn from two established 
sources, the UK’s Workplace Employee Relations Survey and the joint IFC-ILO Better Work 
Programme’s ‘compliance assessment tool’. The questions were grouped into five areas depending 
on whether they are intended to collect information on: the level of knowledge about the IFC and its 
performance standards among employees of IFC client businesses and the degree to which union 
representatives and managers have taken action specifically in response to the standards; the 
presence of active unions and levels of union membership in the workplace together with the 
attitudes of management and workers towards unions; on whether any unions are recognised by 
management for representation and bargaining purposes; and on the degree to which social dialogue 
– collective bargaining and consultation – takes place within the workplace.  
8. Findings	  
In this section of the paper we discuss each of our four hypotheses in turn in the light of the 
information we were able to gather from our analysis of IFC sources and our own survey data. 
External	  differentiation	  
With regard to the evaluation of whether IFC client businesses are different from similar non-client 
businesses we are only able to consider union density as there is a lack of baseline firm level data 
about the incidence of collective bargaining. That having been said, we can report that there seems 
to be a collective bargaining agreement in place in 49 out of the 145 businesses in our sample. We 
also have direct evidence that there is no collective bargaining in 31 businesses. We were unable to 
determine whether there was any bargaining in the remaining 65, although we are aware that there 
are union members in at least 6 of these businesses. 
With respect to the question of density, whether or not there is a systematic difference between the 
level of union density in IFC client and non-client businesses looks like it ought to be a matter of 
averages. As long as there is some way of identifying the size, industrial sector and location of each 
business for which a figure exists, average density and variance can be calculated for each sub-
sample. With these statistics in hand the significance of any difference in membership density 
between IFC client businesses and the regional and sectoral norm could in principle be assessed. 
However, there are two reasons this approach has to be ruled out. The first and more important is 
that union density scores are not normally distributed and parametric statistical tests are therefore 
inappropriate. The second reason is data quality. The World Bank firm-level data we have available 
about union density is for the most part based on employer estimates and takes the form of a single 
percentage figure with no information about the basis of calculation. We do not know, for example, 
whether part-time workers, workers on temporary contracts or agency workers are included. It 
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would be impossible to use this kind of data as the basis for calculating robust cross-nationally 
comparable sectoral, regional or national average levels of union density. 
Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to assume that firm-level employer estimates of union 
membership tell us nothing at all. Where an employer reports 100% union membership this is 
almost guaranteed to be wrong, but it still says something important about relationships within the 
business work. The figure can be interpreted as an opinion about how important and present trade 
unions are in a firm that is closer to an ordinal than an interval measurement. From this perspective, 
a reported 100% union membership is higher than 50% membership, but the ‘higherness’ is what 
counts rather than the 50 percentage point difference. Interpreting the management-reported density 
figures in this way implies the need to use a statistical analysis based on the rank ordering of data. 
Such nonparametric analyses do not take into account the size of the interval between each 
measurement, only their relation to each other. Conveniently, they do not require data to be 
normally distributed and are thus doubly appropriate (DeGroot and Schervish, 2012; Sprent and 
Smeeton, 2000). 
In our case, we need to compare two samples of trade union density scores – IFC client businesses 
and businesses surveyed by the World Bank – with a view to determining the likelihood that they 
are drawn from the same population. Our survey research combined with the IFC’s publicly 
available information allowed us to estimate a density figure with reasonable confidence for 71 out 
of the 145 businesses in our original target group. Most figures were simply stated by management 
in the information provided to IFC. In some cases the density figure was calculated on the basis of a 
number of union members stated by managers or union representatives and the figure for the 
number of employees given to IFC by the business. This density data was combined in a single 
database with data extracted from the latest available World Bank Enterprise Survey for each 
country that included a question to managers about union density. The first step is to split our 
samples into matched subsamples of businesses in the same sector and location. So for example, 
IFC client businesses in the manufacturing sector in Tanzania would be matched with Tanzanian 
manufacturing businesses for which World Bank Data is available. The second step is to combine 
the matched subsamples and rank the density scores from the lowest to the highest. Each rank can 
be expressed as a percentile, making it comparable with rank scores from other subsamples. 
If the IFC and non-IFC samples are drawn from the same population – which is to say, there is 
neither a selection nor a treatment effect on union density – the percentile ranks from one sample 
will not be concentrated disproportionately in either the top or bottom half of the combined 
ordering. If this is the case, and if the groups are the same size, then the sum of the ranks in each 
group will be more or less equal. If the samples are in fact from different populations, i.e. if one set 
of scores is systematically higher or lower than the other, the sum of the rankings in each group will 
be significantly different. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (also known as the Mann Whitney U test -- 
see Sprent and Smeeton, 2000, pp. 147–153), the nonparametric equivalent of a t-test for 
independent samples, is a means of determining whether any difference between the sums of ranks 
is significant. It includes a means of compensating for unequal sample sizes. In our case the test 
shows a highly significant (p<0.01) difference between IFC and non-IFC client businesses, with the 
IFC businesses having higher union density. It is interesting to note the value of the non-parametric 
approach: if we calculate simple averages and variance there appears to be no significant difference 
between the groups. The average union density for IFC client businesses is slightly higher at 23% as 
opposed to 20.5%, but this difference is not statistically significant. A simple inspection of table 1 
below, however, shows that there are indeed some major differences between IFC client and non-
client businesses. The table shows the percentage of IFC client and non-client businesses whose 
union density scores fall into each interval. 
The significance of the difference between the level of union membership in IFC and non-IFC 
clients persists even if we attempt to interpolate density values for the 75 businesses for which we 
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were unable to find a reasonably reliable density figure. Among these, there were 28 in which IFC 
information gave a clear indication that collective bargaining was going on in the business. In these 
cases we can use the average union density figure for the sector and region. In the remaining 47 
businesses, in which no mention is made in any source of information of union membership or 
collective bargaining, we can set the union density to zero. These interpolations are, of course, 
wholly unjustifiable from a statistical standpoint, and have the effect of significantly increasing the 
proportion of enterprises in which union density is zero. Nevertheless, repeating the calculation 
using these adjusted figures is a useful indication that the difference between the two groups reflects 
a substantive distinguishing feature of IFC client businesses. 







Our survey data provides prima facie evidence that despite the performance standards, violations of 
these rights are, if not commonplace or systematic, then at least not unusual. 297 workers employed 
in 55 businesses answered our questions about management attitudes to trade unions and whether 
they knew of any circumstances in which union membership or activity had been punished or non-
membership rewarded. 
• 73 workers employed in 25 different businesses reported that their employer was opposed to 
unionization. This represents 33.8% of responses other than ‘don’t know’. 51 workers 
responded that their employer was in favour of unionization and 93 that it was neutral on the 
issue. 
• 42 workers employed in 17 different enterprises reported that they knew of cases in which 
employees had been punished or threatened for union membership or activities. This 
represents 22% of all workers responding either yes or no to this question rather than ‘don’t 
know’. When asked to specify what kind of reprisals workers had suffered, 24 respondents 
reported that they knew of cases of firing, 5 reported demotion, denial of promotion or 
obligatory transfer to an inferior post while 10 reported other types of harassment or 
intimidation. 
• 20 workers employed in 9 different businesses reported that they knew of cases in which 
workers had been rewarded for not taking up union membership or not engaging in union 
activities. This represents 12.3% of all workers responding either yes or no to this question 
rather than ‘don’t know’. When asked to specify what kind of rewards workers had been 
given, 13 respondents reported that they knew of cases of promotion, 7 knew of wage 
increases and 2 of transfers to better positions. 
• 50 workers employed in 13 different businesses reported that they knew of cases in which 
their employer had taken some kind of action to prevent workers from participating in 
strikes 
• Overall, 71 workers in 22 businesses reported one or more of the three types of violation. A 
violation was reported by an average of 55% of workers in each business where at least one 
worker reported a violation. 
Density	   Not	  IFC	  
client	  
IFC	  Client	  
0%	   69.2%	   50.7%	  
1%-­‐33%	   8.0%	   19.2%	  
34%-­‐66%	   5.1%	   17.8%	  
67%-­‐100%	   17.8%	   12.3%	  
Total	   100.0%	   100.0%	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We have more information on two cases in Turkey and another two in Kenya.  
Turkey	  
Within the last five years in Turkey, two complaints have been made to the IFC’s internal oversight 
office, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO). The CAO has published reports on these two 
cases, and we were able to talk with workers and union representatives in one of the businesses 
involved. Both complaints had been made by a trade union seeking recognition.  
In the case of Assan Aluminium, the union claimed that a range of management tactics, notably 
firings of union members, was artificially keeping membership under the 50% threshold required to 
make recognition obligatory. Certain production plants belonging to the business had historically 
been unionized and others not. At some point a system of management-appointed worker 
representatives was established in a plant which had been unionized in the past but in which union 
membership had fallen below the threshold at which the business was legally required to recognise 
the union and engage in collective bargaining.3 Although it is not explicitly stated in the available 
documentation, we can assume that the business at this point derecognised the union. The ESRS for 
the project states that the system of management-appointed representatives, presumably put into 
place after derecognition, should be replaced with a system in which representatives are elected. 
The business also makes the usual commitment to ensuring that freedom of association was 
included in its HR policy, but adds that “the revised Human Resources Policy will be explained to 
[the] workforce through a program of training designed to raise awareness of the rights and 
responsibilities imposed on both the Company and employees by the Human Resources Policy”.4 
In the second case, involving an automotive parts business called Standard Profil, the business had 
been the subject of a trade union complaint that IFC was failing properly to enforce the PS2 
provisions with respect to workers’ organizations, again focused mainly on tactics designed to 
ensure that the union did not pass the 50% membership threshold required for compulsory 
recognition. One of the business’s plants had been unionized for several years in the 1990s, but 
management had derecognised the union after membership fell below 50%. According the workers 
we spoke to this was due to the dismissal of union members. The workers reported that there had 
been a series of labour court cases that had found that continuing dismissals of groups of 20-30 
workers at a time were linked to union membership, but that the business had simply paid the fines 
imposed by the court and refused to reinstate the workers concerned, thus maintaining the level of 
union membership at less than 50%. 
In its report on the Standard Profil case, the CAO noted that it was a ‘shortcoming’ that the 
business’s continuing refusal to talk to the union on the grounds that it had not met the legal criteria 
for compulsory recognition meant that its attempts to resolve the situation could not directly involve 
the complainant. Just to give one example of what this meant in practice, the business refused to 
allow the union to see the results of a labour standards audit commissioned by the CAO (CAO, 
2012, p. 6). 
In the face of management’s continuing refusal to talk to or meet the union, the CAO recommended 
that some kind of worker representative structure be set up. This was known as ‘the social dialogue 
council’. The CAO report states that there were elections for the 60 people who sat on this council, 
but the workers we spoke to believed that those involved were appointed by management. The 
workers made it very clear that they believed this social dialogue mechanism had little credibility 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  Turkey	  the	  threshold	  is	  50%	  of	  the	  permanent	  workforce.	  
4	  ESRS,	  project	  26648.	  There	  are	  notable	  similarities	  between	  the	  pattern	  of	  events	  in	  this	  case	  and	  that	  in	  another	  Turkish	  client	  
business	  at	  which	  we	  were	  able	  to	  interview	  workers	  and	  union	  representatives.	  See	  below,	  section	  2.	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within the plant and that it was a distraction from the unionisation effort. One worker expressed the 
view that it was so transparently a sham that it actually contributed to unionisation. When asked 
whether IFC/CAO had ever spoken to ordinary workers, the response was that they had only spoken 
to members of the social dialogue council. 
Kenya	  
Trade union officers in Kenya drew our attention to two further examples of freedom of association 
violations in IFC client businesses. The power workers union reported their experience of trying to 
claim recognition in a new power plant on the outskirts of Nairobi. After the plant went into 
operation, the union recruited around 25 members from a total staff complement of 60. However, 
the union’s approach to the management of the plant to discuss the possibility of recognition was 
met with a refusal. Union officers were not allowed into the power plant and management continues 
to turn down the union’s requests for a meeting. 
The hotel and education staff workers’ union reported a case in which the union successfully 
recruited more than 50% of the non-teaching staff at a private school in the late 1990s and were 
subsequently awarded recognition. However, the school management resisted the union’s efforts to 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and within a year of recognition having been awarded 
most of the union members at the school had been dismissed for a variety of reasons. Since then, 
despite the union’s recognition remaining legally valid, management has continued to refuse to 
meet with the union and continuing efforts to recruit workers have been unsuccessful. 
What	  counts	  as	  compliance?	  
On the basis of our survey data, the hypothesis that there will be no significant violations of the 
performance standards provisions on workers’ organizations has to be rejected. Certainly, the 
claims made by the workers’ we interviewed are uncorroborated, but it seems very unlikely that all 
or a majority of them are false or mistaken. However, it is clear that there are some unresolved 
issues surrounding the interpretation of what respect for freedom of association means in practice. 
In both of the cases in Kenya, for example, the unions believed that the businesses in question were 
not behaving properly despite their on-paper compliance with the law on recognition. Yet, the 
reaction of the CAO to the Turkish complaints suggests that for IFC, compliance with the letter of 
national law is the factor that ultimately determines whether any sanctions will be taken in response 
to claims about breaches of the performance standards on workers’ organizations. We will discuss 
this issue further below. 
Internal	  change	  –	  direct	  effects	  
For each client business classed as risk category A or B, the IFC publishes an ‘environmental and 
social review summary’ (ESRS) which is a resumé of the results of the compliance review carried 
out either by IFC internal experts or consultants hired specifically for the task. The ESRS sets out 
the performance standards identified as applicable during the review together with the measures that 
the client has agreed will be taken to mitigate any problems with compliance. For each of the 135 
enterprises in our sample for which an ESRS has been published, we coded the mitigation measures 
specified with respect to PS2 (excluding occupational health and safety measures) according to 
seven non-mutually-exclusive possible actions. Table 2 sets out these actions together with their 
incidence in each region. 
As the table shows, by some way the most common mitigation measure is the development or 
updating of a formal human resource management policy, by which the IFC means a set of written 
procedures accessible to all employees that set out the principles of management the business will 
follow, the basic terms and conditions of employment and the practices and procedures that will be 
applied with respect to recruitment, maternity leave, training and so forth. The next most frequently 
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mentioned measure is the establishment of a formal grievance redress procedure. Together, the 
formalization of HR policy and the establishment of grievance procedures make up 70% of the PS2-
related mitigation measures we were able to identify (not including measures related to 
occupational health and safety). 
Table 2: PS2-related mitigation measures 
 Brazil EAC India Turke
y 
Total 
Total number of client businesses in each country 42 32 40 32 146 
No ESRS (risk category C project) 6 1 2 1 10 
Number of businesses in which no PS2-related mitigation measures are 
specified (excluding OHS) 
20 21 18 13 72 
Number of businesses in which PS2-related mitigation measures are 
specified (excluding OHS) 
16 10 20 18 64 
Percentage of businesses in each region in which PS2-related mitigation 
measures are specified 
38.1% 31.3% 50% 56.3% 43.8% 
Incidence of mitigation measures       
• Formal written human resources policies/procedures/practices to be 
developed or reviewed and brought into line with PS2 where 
necessary 
12 8 13 10 43 
• Freedom of association and collective bargaining rights to be 
incorporated into formal HR policy 
4 0 1 5 10 
• Formal employee grievance redress procedure to be established or 
reviewed and brought into line with PS2 where necessary 
9 2 8 4 23 
• Extension of normal HR practices to include contractor or 
temporary employees or correction of other differences of treatment 
between directly and indirectly employed workers 
1 1 3 0 5 
• HR policies/procedures/practices to be communicated (or 
communicated more effectively) to employees 
4 1 3 1 9 
• Information specifically about freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights to be communicated (or communicated more 
effectively) to employees 
2 0 0 1 3 
• Non-union elected employee representative structures to be 
established or reviewed and brought into line with PS2 where 
necessary 
0 0 0 2 2 
Average number of PS2 mitigation measures per business 2.00 1.40 1.40 1.28 1.48 
 
There are only ten businesses (out of a total of 64 where any measures are specified) for which 
mitigation measures contain some explicit reference to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights. One of these businesses recognized a union and took part in collective 
bargaining, and another reported that there were union members present in its workforce but that it 
did not recognize any unions. The others were not unionized. For all ten businesses, the inclusion of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights in written, PS2-compliant HR policies is 
specified. In three cases, businesses also committed themselves to informing workers about these 
rights, for example via the provision of information in local languages.  
In only two cases was any more specific action required. One (non-unionized) business committed 
itself to correcting an unspecified difference in treatment between white- and blue-collar staff with 
respect to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. Another business reported that 
‘historic anti-union activity’ had been alleged, but claimed that a third party audit had found ‘no 
evidence of suppression of freedom of association’.5  
One further case merits some attention, although freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights are not specifically mentioned in the ESRS. In this case, the business committed itself to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  ESRS,	  project	  26648.	  The	  reference	  to	  ‘historic	  allegations	  of	  anti-­‐union	  activity’	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  reference	  to	  a	  CAO	  investigation	  of	  a	  
complaint	  made	  by	  the	  metal-­‐working	  union	  during	  the	  initial	  environmental	  and	  social	  review.	  More	  details	  of	  this	  case	  are	  
given	  below	  in	  section	  (b)	  on	  violations	  on	  freedom	  of	  association.	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organising the election of workers who will act as ‘liaisons’ with the existing worker representative, 
who is a “qualified professional, hired and appointed by management”.6 It is also reported that one 
specific IFC requirement is that a system of elected worker representatives be established in a plant 
in Jordan: “In order to further improve worker-management communication, ensure any grievances 
rise quickly to management attention and to help ensure transparency in workers’-management 
relationship, [the business] will ensure that all workers’ representatives are freely chosen by the 
workers through a voting system. [The business] in consultation with IFC will establish clear 
responsibilities and describe the main function of a workers’ representative in order for workers to 
better understand the scope of the function. Training will be provided accordingly.”7 
Implementation	  of	  mitigation	  measures	  
Our analysis of mitigation measures shows that with respect to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, IFC is willing to demand only a very narrow range of concrete changes from 
its clients, and this only infrequently. We were surprised to find that of the 145 businesses we 
looked at, only 10 were asked to take any action and of these, seven were merely required to 
include a commitment to respecting the provisions on workers’ organizations in a written human 
resources policy. As none of the businesses required to take measures were among the 18 where we 
were able to interview a management representative, we have no information about whether the 
required measures were actually taken. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that they were, given 
the minimal commitment of resources involved and the fact that in most cases the measure were 
limited to the level of policy statements and did not specify any changes in practice. However, the 
fact that a commitment to respect freedom of association and collective bargaining rights is 
included in a formal written HR policy tells us nothing about the concrete practices of a business. 
Similarly, knowing that certain IFC clients had indeed taken steps to inform their employees of 
their commitment to respect freedom of association would tell us nothing about whether that 
communication was effective in the sense of increasing employee awareness of their rights, still less 
whether that increased awareness led to increased union membership or the establishment of 
collective bargaining. 
In the sole case where an allegation of anti-union activity is mentioned in an ESRS, the business in 
question denies the allegation, referring to the findings of a third party audit. If we assume 
nevertheless that the mitigation measures specified in this case are a response to that allegation, the 
move from an appointed to an elected system of non-union worker representation in a plant that has 
historically been unionized represents at best only a very small step in the direction of greater 
freedom of association. At worst, the persistence of non-union representation, even where 
representatives are elected, could be seen as a continuing obstacle in the way of freedom of 
association, especially considering that in this case the role and function of workers’ representatives 
appears to be unilaterally defined by the business (in consultation with IFC). 
Action	  in	  response	  to	  complaints	  
The information we have available about IFC’s actions in response to complaints is inevitably 
incomplete as the IFC itself does not disclose any information about standards compliance and 
enforcement over the course of each investment project. All that is disclosed is the environmental 
and social action plan (if one is agreed). No information is made available about whether and what 
action is taken to implement ESAPs. IFC turned down our request to accompany social and 
environmental compliance staff on supervision visits.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  ESRS,	  project	  26376.	  
7	  ESRS,	  project	  26376.	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However, if a complaint is made to the office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman and if a 
decision is made to investigate it, that complaint is made public and information on the case is 
posted on the CAO website. As of January 2015, information on 130 separate complaints made 
about a total of 74 investment projects was available on this site. Of these complaints, four involved 
freedom of association issues. Three of these were registered by trade unions and a fourth by a 
group of labour NGOs. One further complaint was made by a trade union, but this was about labour 
issues that did not include freedom of association. Of the freedom of association cases, two have 
been closed, a third is awaiting the publication of the CAO report and the fourth is currently 
ongoing. 
Given the range of subjects that the performance standards cover, the figure of 4 complaints out of 
130 whose subject was freedom of association is perhaps not so surprising. On the other hand, 
however, that only four formal complaints were made arising from almost 1000 non-financial sector 
projects funded by IFC since the performance standards system was introduced (see below, annexe 
on data & methodology) does not square with our survey finding of freedom of association 
violations reported in 22 out of 55 businesses. Even if we assume that the three cases that made it as 
far as a formal complaint represent the worst cases, it still suggests that there is a level of casual 
anti-unionism in a significant number of businesses that the IFC’s performance standards system is 
doing nothing to address. We will see in a moment that one of the most likely reasons for this is 
simply that IFC never hears about this behaviour because most workers are unaware that their 
employer has committed itself to respecting the performance standards. 
The ITUC mechanism has given rise to 36 complaints between 2004 and 2014. ITUC was able to 
provide us with summary information about the first 26 of these. Within this group of complaints, 
20 included complaints of violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. 
Three complaints went on to be investigated by the CAO. The two CAO cases that are now closed 
were the Assan Aluminium and Standard Profil cases that we discussed above. Of the twenty 
freedom of association complaints, two involved businesses that folded before any investment was 
finally made, IFC decided not to proceed with its investment in three cases, two cases finished with 
the establishment of union recognition and the agreement of a collective bargaining agreement, 
eight led to some sort of mitigation measures related to freedom of association that stopped short of 
union recognition, three gave rise to no change at all, and the results of two were unknown at the 
time the document on which this information is based was produced. 
The ITUC itself believes that although the performance standards system is no cure-all, it has drawn 
certain 'lines in the sand' that have been useful reference points for union campaigns. According to 
Peter Bakvis,8 Director of the ITUC/Global Unions Washington DC office, the complaints 
mechanism has helped unions to articulate and communicate complaints about IFC client 
businesses. Although unions have not been satisfied with IFC’s response to some of their 
complaints, on a number of occasions the mechanism has contributed to a resolution of problems, 
particularly in the arena of freedom of association. Ongoing informal contacts between IFC and 
ITUC have also permitted the early identification and avoidance of potentially problematic 
situations. 
Internal	  change	  –	  indirect	  effects	  
The data we have collected does not offer the possibility of considering the indirect effects 
hypothesis simply because it shows that the content of the performance standards system is not 
widely known. Just 18% of the workers interviewed were aware that the IFC had invested in their 
business and only 6% (18 workers out of 297) knew that the performance standards system exists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Personal	  communication,	  25th	  March	  2015.	  
	  Governing	  by	  Contract	  	   Working	  paper	  Cradden/Graz/Pamingle	   March	  2015	  	  
20	  
and that it contains guarantees about freedom of association and collective bargaining. (It is 
interesting to note that five of these eighteen workers were employed in a business that had been the 
subject of a complaint and in which the CAO had required that the business provide information 
about the performance standards to workers.) With such a small proportion of workers aware of the 
performance standards and their content as it relates to workers’ organizations, it would be wholly 
unrealistic to expect there to be any kind of effect on the perceived legitimacy of unionization and 
collective bargaining. 
What is more, of the eight businesses where at least one worker reported being aware of the 
employer’s commitment to respect freedom of association and collective bargaining, five are 
already unionised with active collective bargaining. Union officers were rather more aware of the 
performance standards, with 10 out of 33 respondents (30%) reporting some knowledge the PS 
requirements. However only two of these officers dealt with workplaces that were not already 
unionised. Notably, none reported having been given information about the performance standards 
by the business itself. 
It may be the case that management attitudes change independently of worker pressure in response 
to a declaration of adherence to the performance standards. If this is the case, workers may notice a 
change in attitude regardless of whether they are aware of the performance standards. The workers 
we surveyed were asked whether they thought the attitude of management in their workplace to 
trade unionism had changed over the last 3 to 5 years. 227 workers gave a response other than 
‘Don’t know’. Of these, 28 reported that managers in their workplace had recently become more 
favourable to trade unionism. However, 29 reported that managers had recently become less 
favourable. 
9. Discussion	  
In this paper we have looked at four possible areas in which the performance standards and IFC’s 
supervision process might have had an impact on industrial relations processes in client businesses. 
We considered the evidence of IFC interventions on union density, on restraining violations of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, on supporting mitigation measures and 
complaints procedures, as well as the extent to which the performance standards system is likely to 
have indirect effects on union membership and social dialogue via its impact on the industrial 
relations climate or atmosphere. 
At first glance, our finding suggests a positive effect on union density, as IFC client businesses 
scores on average higher than similar non-client businesses. However, this needs to be interpreted 
with extreme care. Our analysis of the PS2-related mitigation measures clearly suggests that the 
likelihood of IFC requiring its clients to take any kind of action that will promote or encourage 
unionization is extremely small. Even in those cases where some kind of action was required it 
remained largely on the level of written policy or, in three cases, the provision of information. The 
single case in which some kind of action was demanded with respect to worker representative 
structures seemed as likely to create obstacles to unionization as to encourage it. We also know that 
only 6% of the workers we interviewed were aware that their employer had committed itself to 
respecting the performance standards on workers’ organizations.  
Yet, union officers did report some modest gains from the application of the PS. As we found in 
several cases we examined in Africa (Cradden & Graz 2014), these gains were driven by existing 
trade unions acting entirely on their own initiative. Three officers (all in Brazil) reported that they 
had been able to use the performance standards to make some small gains in the context of their 
existing relationship with an employer. In two cases, workers’ rights to attend union meetings 
without penalty had been improved, and in one case reference to the performance standards had 
given the union more leverage in negotiations. In the single case of which we are aware in which a 
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union was recognised subsequent to an IFC investment in an existing business – Standard Profil in 
Turkey – there is little evidence that the performance standards were a factor. As we saw above, the 
CAO was unwilling even to insist that the business meet with the union, and according to union 
representatives the main reason that recognition was won was the unexpected decision of a large 
group of short-term contract workers to join the union en masse, which pushed membership 
securely over the required 50% threshold.  
In short, given the absence of IFC compliance requirements beyond respect for labour law 
according to local practice, and the low level of awareness among workers and their representatives 
that their employer had committed itself to respecting transnational standards on freedom of 
association and collective bargaining rights, there is no good reason to believe that becoming an 
IFC client will have any significant effect on unionization. We conclude from this that the 
apparently higher level of union membership among IFC clients than in similar non-client 
businesses must be due to the IFC client selection process rather than to any change in practices 
related to IFC supervision of performance standards compliance. 
Our second finding is that the performance standards and IFC’s supervision system have been 
notably ineffective in preventing anti-union activity by managers, with a significant minority of 
workers reporting a range of violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. 
71 workers (24%) in 22 separate businesses reported some kind of violation, whether reprisals for 
union membership or activity, rewards for avoiding union activities or attempts at strikebreaking.  
Third, we have the question of mitigation measures and complaints. To the very limited extent that 
the mitigation measures IFC demands concern freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights, the requirements for action are overwhelmingly to do with formal management systems 
rather than the outcomes of those systems for employees. What seems to count for the IFC is the 
ability to point to evidence that businesses take the relevant labour standards into account in their 
approach to management without having to take a view on whether employee welfare is thereby 
improved in any tangible way. The mitigation measures specified are intended to ensure that that 
evidence is available and as such are arguably for the benefit of the IFC rather than that of workers. 
While we are unable to say whether or not change coherent with IFC’s requirements took place in 
the businesses in question, our analysis of the available ESRS shows that even had we been able to 
confirm compliance with the measures, we would still have been unable to say whether this had led 
to any change in levels of union membership, organization and recognition. 
Our fourth finding relates to our indirect effects hypothesis. In the absence of any knowledge of the 
performance standards among workers – we found that 94% workers were unaware of the 
performance standards – any change to the industrial relations climate is obviously very unlikely. 
There was also little evidence of any consistent change in employer behaviour, with roughly equal 
numbers of workers reporting an improved and a worsened management attitude to unionisation. 
The	  contractual	  structure	  of	  private	  labour	  governance	  
This study fills a gap in the existing literature by examining the impact of a single transnational 
private regulation scheme across a number of national and sectoral contexts. Our findings suggest 
that the impact of the performance standards system on industrial relations is at best marginal. In 
our view, this lack of impact can be traced to the contractual structure which is the legal basis for 
the ‘rights’ extended to workers by the IFC rules. This is all the more important as this contractual 
structure applies to every major type of transnational private regulation. 
There are two variants of this structure. In one variant, commercial contracts creating supply chain 
or investment relationships include clauses creating an obligation on a supplier or investment client 
to respect certain standards and to allow the other contracting party – the lead firm or investor – 
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access to business premises and records for the purposes of the monitoring and evaluation of 
compliance. This is precisely what happens in the IFC case: compliance with the performance 
standards is a contractual duty of the client. The second variant of the legal structure underpinning 
private regulation involves the licensing of rights to make claims about standards compliance and to 
use logos and other marketing materials. In this case, the commercial contract is that which makes 
the right of an enterprise to use the logo of the regulation scheme on its packaging and to make 
compliance claims conditional on the satisfactory completion of some kind of social and/or 
environmental audit. 
As distinct from rights directly enforceable against an employer by employees and their 
organizations, labour regulation in both variants is based on rights belonging to a third party – the 
lead firm, the investor or the operator of the labelling scheme – that has no legal relationship with 
the workers who are intended to benefit from the enforcement of those rights. It is entirely up to 
third party, in our case the IFC, whether or not to enforce the contractual conditions in question. 
Although it is workers whose rights are ostensibly protected by the performance standards, they are 
not parties to the private contract that provides the legal means by which compliance is enforced. 
The parties are the IFC and the client business. It is therefore up to the IFC to decide whether or not 
the contractual clauses that oblige the client to respect the performance standards are being 
respected and, if not, whether and what action to take to enforce compliance. Rather than being the 
outcome of an independent judicial or arbitration process that can be triggered by worker 
complaints, compliance enforcement depends on the IFC’s awareness of standards violations and on 
its willingness to take action to seek redress.  
This gives rise to certain problems. First is the question of information. Workers may simply not be 
aware that their employer has signed a contract that commits it to respect certain of their rights. If 
this is the case – as our study found with 95% of the workers interviewed – there is no reason why 
they would attempt to seek redress from the IFC for any rights violations. While the IFC monitors 
compliance and in principle could become aware of standards violations independently of workers, 
its principal source of information is the client business itself. The study found little evidence of any 
regular or systematic consultation of workers or unions as part of the IFC supervision process. 
Except in a limited number of cases, client businesses did not inform workers of their rights under 
the performance standards system. 
The second potential problem arises around issues of interpretation. Even where workers or unions 
are aware of the performance standards and seek to persuade IFC to take action against a non-
compliant client, whether or not this occurs depends on IFC accepting that the client is non-
compliant. This in turn depends on the way in which respect for freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights is understood by IFC. The study found that IFC takes a highly legalistic 
view of the performance standards’ requirement that clients should ‘engage’ with unions where 
these are present. A number of cases emerged where client businesses refused to recognise or even 
talk with unions until the membership threshold for compulsory recognition (usually 50% of 
employees) had been passed. IFC took no action in these cases, even where membership levels were 
approaching the threshold measure and there was prima facie evidence of active dissuasion of union 
membership by management. The IFC’s exaggerated neutrality about unionization seems to be 
based on the assumption that employers have no duty to respect workers’ preferences with respect 
to union organization and collective bargaining beyond the letter of their legal obligations. The 
consequence is a situation in which unions remain formally invisible within IFC compliance 
procedures until the point at which they are made visible by compulsory recognition. However, 
violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights frequently concern precisely 
the issues of recognition and derecognition, notably management actions designed either to prevent 
a union winning recognition or to create the conditions under which a recognized union can 
lawfully be derecognized. The IFC’s interpretation of the workers’ organizations provisions in the 
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performance standards is such that it is unwilling to gainsay local labour law when it comes to trade 
union recognition, regardless of any objective difficulties there may be with content and 
enforcement. It has scrupulously avoided adopting any substantive definition of what constitutes 
reasonable employer behaviour in the face of employee demands for unionization or complaints 
about the violation of freedom of association rights. In this sense, it is not applying a transnational 
standard but merely insisting on the application of the letter of national law as determined via 
national judicial procedures. 
The third problem is conflict of interest. Even where it can be established that a client is non-
compliant, the IFC’s decision about whether to take measures to enforce the performance standards 
is taken from the perspective of the value of the investment contract as a whole. Within the IFC’s 
internal procedures there is no attempt to separate the social and environmental aspects of risk 
management from the financial aspects. Compliance enforcement decisions are not made 
independently of any consideration of IFC’s interest in maintaining the financial relationship with 
the client. The final decision to withdraw from an investment is not made by the IFC’s social and 
environmental compliance experts, but by investment officers whose role is focused principally on 
finance. Where the decision is made to withdraw from an investment because of unaddressed 
standards violations, this decision is not made public. Rather, any reference to the client is simply 
removed from the IFC’s publicly accessible project database. Interviews with IFC staff suggest that 
this practice has been adopted to ensure that the enforcement of the performance standards does not 
become a reason for potential clients to look elsewhere for finance. 
10. Conclusion	  
In this paper we have engaged with the controversial issue of the potential effect of transnational 
private regulation schemes in the domain of labour standards. The study reported in the paper 
suggests that the International Finance Corporation’s ‘Performance Standards’ system has at best a 
marginal effect on workers’ capacity to take collective action. While these empirical findings 
cannot be generalised to other private regulation schemes, they confirm earlier findings suggesting 
that transnational private labour regulation has a poor record on process rights such as freedom of 
association and collective bargaining guarantees, despite their critical importance. This contrasts 
with the case of outcome standards, for example those dealing with pay, holiday entitlements or 
safety requirements, where TPLR seems to have established a modest record of improvement.  
We argued that the lack of impact of transnational private labour regulation schemes can be 
explained to some extent by the legal structure of the contract engaging the parties concerned. The 
weakness of this ‘governance by contract’ lies in the fact that compliance enforcement depends on a 
third party’s willingness to take action to enforce contractual conditions that have some bearing on 
relations between workers and employers. In the case of the performance standards system, the 
IFC’s capacity to decide whether or not to enforce its contractual rights against its clients is almost 
unlimited, with no precise template for standards compliance and no independent process for the 
evaluation of claims of non-compliance. There is remarkably little scope for workers to take action 
within the regulatory structure. 
This raises the question of power. From the workers’ perspective, the enforcement of IFC labour 
standards is a question of political organization and action rather than of triggering a process of 
regulatory intervention. Whether or not the public normative commitment involved in agreeing to 
comply with the standards results in a change of management attitude or behaviour depends on the 
capacity of workers (a) to collect information about standards violations and to communicate this to 
the IFC; (b) to establish that what they interpret as standards violations are indeed violations; and, 
above all, (c) to create the kind of political and industrial pressure that would outweigh the IFC’s 
commercial and reputational interest in not sanctioning its existing clients. The study identified a 
small number of cases where workers and unions had the capacity to do some or all of these things. 
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However, in the particular case of freedom of association and collective bargaining, the rights 
supposedly guaranteed by the standards are precisely those that provide workers with the capacities 
that make political action possible. The study showed that the IFC takes few if any proactive steps 
to enforce these rights and uncovered no case in which the performance standards contributed to the 
organization of a previously unorganized workforce without the intervention of an existing union. 
When it comes to the enforcement of freedom of association rights, workers who are not already 
well organized are caught in a ‘catch 22’: they need to already possess the collective capacity to 
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